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DAMAGES AND ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE IN
UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES*
HARRY D. NIms
Theory That Defendant's Profits Will Be Limited to the Sales Which Were
Induced by Defendant's Unfair Acts
In 1942, in the Mishawaska case, the Supreme Court held that the owner
of a registered trade-mark is not required to show that purchasers of goods
bearing the infringing mark were induced to buy because of defendant's acts,
but saying, "The plaintiff, of course, is not entitled to profits demonstrably
not attributable to the unlawful use of his mark." The same rule undoubtedly
applies to cases involving all trade symbols whether registered or not.'38
The burden of such a contention rests upon the defendant. "It having
been found that, in marketing their product in the way in which they did,
the defendants were infringing plaintiff's trade-mark, it follows that the lat-
ter was entitled to the profits realized on such infringing sales, due to the
use of the trade-mark. The profits on such sales having been shown, and it
being inherently impossible for the plaintiff to show what part of them
were attributable to the use of the trade-mark, and what part, if any, to other
causes, the burden was then cast upon the defendants to show what part,
if any, were due to causes other than the use of the trade-mark."'' l
*This is the second of two installments under this heading; the first appeared in
(1946) 31 CORNELL L. Q. 431. This article is an excerpt from the fourth edition of
Mr. Nims' book, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRaDn-MARrs, which is soon to be pub-
lished.-Ed.
138Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U. S. 203, 206,
62 Sup. Ct. 1022, 1024, 53 U. S. Pat. Q. 323 (1942). See also Wawak & Co., Inc., v.
Kaiser et al., 129 F. (2d) 66, 70, 54 U. S. Pat. Q. 9 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) ; Brunswick-
Balke-Collender Co. v. American Bowling & Billiard Co., 60 U. S. Pat. Q. 294 (S. D.
N. Y. 1943). In Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U. S. 390, 60 Sup.
Ct. 681, 44 U. S. Pat. Q. 607 (1940), which was a copyright infringement case, the
theory and application of the rule as to apportionment are discussed at some length.
13 9Prest-O-Lite v. Bournonville et ux., 260 Fed. 446, 447 (D. N. J. 1916). See
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U. S. 203, 206, 207,
62 Sup. Ct. 1022, 1024, 53 U. S. Pat. Q. 323 (1942) ; G. &. C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield,
198 Fed. 369, 377 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912) ; Howard Dustless Duster Co. v. Carleton et al.,
244 Fed. 881 (D. Conn. 1916); Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America,
116 F. (2d) 708, 713, 48 U. S. Pat. Q. 268 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) ; Wawak & Co., Inc.,
v. Kaiser et al., 129 F. (2d) 66, 70, 54 U. S. Pat. Q. 9 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) ; Obear-
Nester Glass Co. v. United Drug Co., 53 F. Supp. 744, 60 U. S. Pat. Q. 171 (E. D.
Mo. 1944). In Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U. S. 390, 405, 60 Sup.
Ct. 681, 686, 44 U. S. Pat. Q. 607 (1940). Chief Justice Hughes, in referring to
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros., 240 U. S. 251, 36 Sup. Ct. 269 (1916), and
explaining why in that-case there could be no apportionment said, "The burden cast
upon the defendant had not been sustained."
UNFAIR COMPETITION
To be admissible, such rebuttal evidence must be available with regard
to a reasonable proportion of the sales. If defendant can separate out sales
effectuated by other elements, then net profits may be apportioned; but
where there are thousands of consumers, and it is impossible to produce
evidence with regard to any considerable number of them, the entire net
profit from all sales should be granted to the injured party.140
It is argued that a trade-mark infringer need not account for the entire
profit which he makes in selling the merchandise under an infringing mark
but that the intrinsic value of the goods should be given consideration.
Granted that the infringing mark enabled the infringer to make sales which
he otherwise might not have made, the argument is that he would have sold
some goods without it and would have made some profit and that he should
not sacrifice that part of his profits to plaintiff. "The argument reduces
itself to this: The defendant says: 'If I had been honest, I could have sold
at least a part of these goods and as you have failed to show what that part
is, you are entitled to recover nothing.' The answer is: 'You were not
honest.' "141
"The defendants were not entitled as of right under the circumstances
to show sales made by them to their old customers and establish thereby
what they might have made if they had conducted their business without
attempting to appropriate the benefit of the name of the plaintiff."'4
Irrespective of whether or not it can be shown that certain sales were made
in reliance on defendant's reputation, nothing short of defendant's entire net
profits from the use of the infringing package may afford adequate relief.
"If the rule contended for by Wrigley were here to prevail, it is apparent
that little or no proof could be made of substantial profits, or damages either.
It would be manifestly impossible, even if the infringement were of the
'Chinese copy' variety to show that, but for the sale of Wrigley's 'Double-
mint' in the infringing dress, the individual users would have purchased
Larson's 'Wintermint.' Even if in a few instances this might be done, it
140L. P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 20 F. (2d) 830, 831 (C. C. A.
7th, 1927). See also the decision below, William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. Larson, Jr., Co.,
5 F. (2d) 731, 739 (N. D. Ill. 1925). In Globe-Wernicke Co. v. Safe-Cabinet Co.,
110 Ohio St 609, 144 N. E. 711, 15 T. M. Rep. 14 (1924), the court sustained a master's
refusal to receive evidence that certain purchasers of defendant's cabinets had bought
them understanding them to be defendant's cabinets. This decision was followed in
Jones v. Roshenberger, 82 Ind. App. 97, 144 N. E. 858 (1924). See also W. B. Mfg.
Co. v. Rubenstein et al., 236 Mass. 215, 128 N. E. 21, 10 T. M. Rep. 368 (1920).141Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 138 Fed. 22 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905). See also
W. B. Mfg. Co. v. Rubenstein et al., 236 Mass. 215, 220, 128 N. E. 21, 22, 10 T. M. Rep.
368, 371 (1920).
142W. B. Mfg. Co. v. Rubenstein et al., 236 Mass. 215, 220, 128 N. E. 21, 22, 10 T.
M. Rep. 368, 371 (1920).
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would be humanly impossible, even though the effort and expense were not
prohibitive, to have sought out and produced the evidence from any con-
siderable number of users. Neither could it be known into what territory
Larson would have pushed its trade, but for Wrigley's oppressive and fore-
stalling practices. The entrant into a field of endeavor might, thus early
in his business career, be throttled and eliminated from competition, and his
distinctive trade dress seized and used by a powerful opponent, with no
measure for affording adequate. relief. The more flagrant, and therefore the
more effective, the invasion of another's rights, the more certain and com-
plete would be the invader's immunity."' 43
In 1925, the Sixth Circuit allowed recovery of both damages and profits
on all sales of a defendant's goods marked with the offending mark, where
the evidence showed that retailers passed off defendant's good to plaintiff's
investigators in many places, and held that it is not necessary, under such
circumstances, to show sales where purchasers'were deceived, to obtain an
accounting.14 4
But there are various decisions to the effect that where there is "no sub-
stantial evidence in the case that customers have been deceived or that the
defendant has realized profits from deceptive sales or that the plaintiff has
sustained any actual damage by the defendant's competition," an accounting
will not be granted,'4 and that a party is not entitled to an accounting
where he fails to prove lost sales due to deceit of consumers.1 46 Where there
143L. P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 20 F. (2d) 830 (C. C. A.
7th, 1927).
144S. S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 3 F. (2d) 415, 419 (C. C. A. 6th,
1925).
145W. G. Reardon Laboratories, Inc. v. B & B Exterminators, 3 F. Supp. 467, 476,
17 U. S. Pat. Q. 406 (D. Md. 1933), aff'd on this point, 71 F. (2d) 515, 22 U. S.
Pat. Q. 22 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934); Ammon & Person v. Narragansett Dairy Co., Ltd.,
262 Fed. 880 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919) ; Pennsylvania Rubber Co. v. Dreadnaught Tire &
Rubber Co., 225 Fed. 138 (D. Del. 1915), modified on other grounds, 229 Fed. 560(C. C. A. 3d, 1916) ; Baker v. Baker, 115 Fed. 297 (C. C. A. 2d, 1902); American
Specialty Co. v. Collis Co., 235 Fed. 929 (S. D. Iowa 1916). See also Allen v. Walker
& Gibson, 235 Fed. 230 (N. D. N. Y. 1916). In J. C. Penny Co. v. H. D. Lee Mer-
cantile Co., 120 F. (2d) 949, 958, 50 U. S. Pat. Q. 165 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) the court
held that it would be inequitable to grant an accounting for profits and damages because
the large sales of defendant's product could not have been the result of the palming
off and no trust in favor of plaintiff was set up since the adoption of the design in
question did not constitute unfair competition. The only evidence of passing off was
to plaintiff's agents and were not instances of actual customer deception.
146Tillman & Bendel, Inc. v. California Packing Corp., 63 F. (2d) 498, 506, 16 U. S.
Pat. Q. 332 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933); Horlicls Malted Milk Corp. v. Horluck's Inc.,
59 F. (2d) 13, 13 U. S. Pat. Q. 296 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); Gallet et al. v. R. & G. Soap
& Supply Co., 254 Fed. 802 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) ; G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198
Fed. 369 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912); S. S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 3 F.
(2d) 415; 420 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
[Vol. 32
UNFAIR COMPETITION
was no evidence that any mistake was ever made by purchasers, and affirma-,
tive evidence that no mistake was ever made to the knowledge of defendant's
officers, an accounting was denied. "So far as profits and damages are
concerned ... the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
has made profits attributable in whole or in part, to its trade-mark." How-
ever, lack of proof that sales have been made to purchasers who thought they
were buying plaintiff's goods is not conclusive against recovery of profits
and damages. But where there is no actual 'wrongful intent to injure the
plaintiff and no substantial damage has as yet occurred from defendant's
acts, accounting has been denied.147 The difficulty lies in the practical im-
possibility, in many instances, of determining what part of the profit resulted
from the intrinsic value of the merchandise and what part was due to the
use of the infringing trade-mark. To attempt to do this may become a
decidedly speculative venture.
The better rule seems to be that the plaintiff is entitled to the entire net
profit on the goods sold under the infringing symbol, without being required
to prove that any or all of such profits are directly and positively attributable
to defendant's wrong. An old decision of the California courts (1871) still
cited in this connection, holds that, "No one will deny that on every prin-
ciple of reason and justice the owner of the trade-mark is entitled to so much
of the profit as resulted from the use of the trade-mark. The difficulty lies in
ascertaining what proportion of the profit is due to the trade-mark, and
what to the intrinsic value of the commodity; and as this cannot be ascer-
tained with any reasonable certainty, it is more consonant with reason and
justice that the owner of the trade-mark should have the whole profit than
that he should be deprived of any part of it by the fraudulent act of the
defendant."'148
An infringing party "will hardly be heard to say that he would have been
equally successful had he used honest indicia and labels. It would be casting
an intolerable burden upon the complainant in such cases if, after proving
the fraud, the infringement and the profits, he were compelled to enter the
realms of speculation and prove the precise proportion of the infringer's
gains attributable to his infringement." This is the rule in Massachusetts,
Kentucky and other jurisdictions. 149
147Hemmeter Cigar Co. v. Congress Cigar Co., Inc., 118 F. (2d) 64, 71, 49 U. S.
Pat. Q. 122 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
148 Graham v. Plate, 40 Cal. 593 (1871) ; Benkert v. Feder, 34 Fed. 534, 535 (N. D.
Cal. 1888).
'
49 Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 138 Fed. 22, 24 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905). See
also Avery v. Meikle, 85 Ky. 435, 3 S. W. 609 (1887); Regis v. Jaynes et al., 191
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In 1912, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals took a more conservative
position, but it has not been generally followed. This was in Rushmore v.
Badger Brass Mfg. Co.150 There the defendant's lamps resembled com-
plainant's in general shape and appearance. "The defendant asks that 'it be
relieved from an accounting or, at least, that the accounting be limited to
the damages actually sustained and proved by the complainant. We are in-
clined to think that the latter request is reasonable and should be granted....
We are also convinced that the great majority of the defendant's lamps
were sold on their merits and on the established reputation of the defendants,
without any reference to the complainant's lamps. To award the entire
profits made on the sales of defendant's lamps without proof of actual
fraud on its part would be inequitable. An accounting covering the entire
field of the defendant's sales would involve both parties in a long and ex-
pensive examination unwarranted by the probable results. It seems to us
unfair that the complainant should recover profits on the sale of lamps by
the defendant to persons who never heard of Rushmore, and were well aware
that the lamps they bought were made by the defendant, and who bought
them because they were so made. A decree for profits and damages does not
necessarily follow a decree for an injunction. . . .We think the accounting
should be limited to sales where it is shown by direct or presumptive evi-
dence that the complainant would have sold the lamps but for the sale by
the defendant."
Yet if the defendant copied the plaintiff's lamp with the specific intent
of selling his lamp as a product of the plaintiff and so purloined plaintiff's
good will and profited by it, what should a court of equity do where a de-
fendant succeeds only partially? The character of defendant's act is the
same, from an equitable standpoint, whether he succeeds or not. If he fails
and pays no damages and is merely enjoined, the plaintiff is penalized at
least to the extent of his expenses and effort to stop the practice. the ques-
tion is not one of legal theory merely. Experience shows that it is idle to
expect any effective regulation of such practices through criminal procedures.
Public policy would seem to invite our courts of equity to find a way not
only to enjoin such methods of competition but to order the payment of some
damages at least.
In 1924, the Ohio Court said: "By the great weight of authority, particu-
larly where the infringement or imitation was deliberate and willful, it is
Mass. 245, 77 N. E. 774 (1906) ; Reading Stove Works, Orr, Painter & Co. v. Howes
Co., 201 Mass. 437, 87 N. E. 751 (1909).
5 0 Rushmore v. Badger Brass Mfg. Co., 198 Fed. 379 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912).
[Vol. 32
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held that the wrongdoer is required to account for all profits realized by him
as a result of his wrongful acts, regardless of any question of deceit or
misrepresentation in the actual making of the sale and the plaintiff in such
action is not required to produce evidence of such actual deceit or mis-
representation in the various and sundry sales made."'151
In 1925, referring to the Hamilton-Brown case, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals said that: "The infringer must account for the entire profits
derived from the sale of the infringing goods. The recovery will not -be
limited to such amount as can be shown by direct and positive evidence to
have resulted from the use of the infringing mark. The burden is not cast
upon the plaintiff to attempt the impossible task of showing what part of
defendant's profits are attributable to the use of tha infringing mark and
what part to the intrinsic merit of his goods or other causes. Whatever
conflict in the previous decisions might be found was put at rest by that
decision."'- 2
In Massachusetts, the defendant must pay over the total profits realized
on goods sold bearing the plaintiff's trade mark.153 Such an offender is liable
for both actual damages and profits, if any, realized on the sale of the
imitation.5 4 The English rule has been the same.' 55 This rule, entitling the
injured party to an accounting of the entire net profit of the infringer, does
not depend on evidence that the plaintiff would have acttially made the same
profit, nor can the accounting be limited to profits which the plaintiff would
have made if his goods had been sold instead of those of the infringer.156
151Globe-Wernicke Co. v. Safe-Cabinet Co., 110 Ohio St. 609, 144 N. E. 711, 15
T. M. Rep. 14 (1924).
'
5 2Dickinson v. 0. & W. Thum Co., 8 F. (2d) 570, 573 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925). De-
fendant here cited Ammon & Person v. Narragansett Dairy Co., Ltd., 252 Fed. 276
(D. R. I. 1918); 254 Fed. 208 (D. R. I. 1918); 262 Fed. 880 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919)
to the contrary. Of these the court said: "We are not satisfied that these cases intend
to announce any views in conflict with the authorities cited, but, if they do, such views
may be disregarded." See also Underhill v. Schenck et aL., 201 App. Div. 46, 51-52,
193 N. Y. Supp. 745, 748-749 (2d Dep't 1922) ; Cano v. Arizona Frozen Products Co.,
38 Ariz. 404, 300 Pac. 953 (1931) ; Trappey et aL. v. Mcllhenny Co., 12 F. (2d) 19,
21 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) ; Wawak & Co. Inc., v. Kaiser et al., 129 F. (2d) 66, 54 U. S.
Pat. Q. 9 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942); Obear-Nester Glass Co. v. United Drug Co., 53 F.
Supp. 744, 60 U. S. Pat. Q. 171 (E. D. Mo. 1944) ; A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Philip
A. Singer & Bros., 119 N. J. Eq. 52, 180 AtI. 671 (1935), a'ffd, 120 N. J. Eq. 76, 183
At. 296 (1936).
'
5 3 Nelson v. J. H. Winchell & Co., 203 Mass. 75, 91, 89 N. E. 180, 187 (1909) citing
Reading Stove Works, Orr, Painter & Co. v. Howes Co., 201 Mass. 437, 87 N. E. 751
(1909); Regis v. Jaynes, 191 Mass. 245, 249, 77 N. E. 774, 776 (1906).
15 4 Forster Mfg. Co. v. Cutter-Tower Co., 211 Mass. 219, 223, 97 N. E. 749, 750 (1912).
'
5 5 Edelsten v. Edelsten, 1 DeG & S. 185 (1863) ; Lever v. Goodwin, 4 Rep. Pat. Cas.
492 (Ch. Div. and Ct. of App., 1887).
15 6Holley Milling Co. v. Salt Lake & Jordan Mill & Elevator Co., 58 Utah 149,
197 Pac. 731, 11 T. M. Rep. (2d) 225 (1921); Ritz Cycle Car Co. v. Driggs-Seabury,
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Where a papkage was copied, the defendant insisted that the plaintiff was
a much smaller concern without either the ability or even the intention of
extending its trade into territory where defendant's merchandise had been
sold, and that profits should therefore be limited at least to sales in common
territory. In rejecting this argument the court pointed out that if that rule
prevailed, little or no proof could be made of substantial profits; and the
more flagrant and therefore the more effective the invasion of another's
rights, the more certain and complete would be the invader's immunity. The
entire net profit from the use of the infringing package was awarded. "That
an award on this basis might permit recovery of a larger sum than would
likely have been the net profits of the injured party, if left undisturbed, is
an accident of the invasion of which this invader is not in position to
complain."'157
Where it is impossible to isolate the profits which are attributable to the
use of the infringing mark, it may prove a windfall to plaintiff, but to hold
otherwise would give the windfall to the wrongdoer.158 This does not mean
that the injured trade-mark owner is entitled to profits which by no theory
could ever have belonged to him and which might have belonged to another.
Thus, for example, while he may be granted the profits which the infringer
made in territory which he, himself, had not yet exploited,15 9 he may not
recover the profits made by the infringer in territory where the plaintiff had
transferred his trade-mark rights to another.160 Where the plaintiff is a
dealer or jobber and does not manufacture and therefore never could have
realized the profits of a manufacturer, he may be limited to dealers' or job-
237 Fed. 125, 130 (S. 'D. N. Y. 1916); Atlantic Milling Co. v. Rowland, 27 Fed. 24
(S. D. N. Y. "1886).
157L. P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 20 F. (2d) 830, 831-832
(C. C. A. 7th, 1927). See also id., 275 Fed. 535, 537 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921) and id.,
5 F. (2d) 731, 737 (N. D. Ill. 1925).
158Mishawaka Rubber & W6olen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U. S. 203, 207,
62 Sup. Ct. 1022, 1024, 53 U. S. Pat. Q. 323 (1942).
159L. P. Larson. Jr., Co. v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 20 F. (2d) 830 (C. C. A. 7th,
1927).
160Lawrence-Williams Co. v. Societe Enfants Gombault et cie, 52 F. (2d) 774, 11
U. S. Pat. Q. 75 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931). The plaintiff, a French manufacturer, granted
exclusive licenses to sell its product, under its trade-mark, in the United States. The
licensee and not the plaintiff was the one entitled to the profits made by sales under
the license. An injunction for trade-mark infringement and an accounting of damages
and profits was limited in time so as not to grant to the plaintiff profits made after it
had transferred its rights in the United States, which equitably belonged to the licensee.
"The principle seems to be that as to territory unreached by plaintiff's trade, it may
be inferred that there was a latent demand for plaintiff's goods which it would even-
tually have supplied, except for the infringement, and hence it has sufficient equitable
right to the infringer's profits. No application of this principle can reach the situation
where the general trade-mark owner has transferred to another those rights from the
exercise of which the profits arose." Id. at 777.
[Vol. 32
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bers' profits and may be denied the manufacturing profits, provided, of
course, these can be thus apportioned.' 61
Other cases hold that where the profits to the infringing party are due
largely to the merits of the article solt, and not to the merit of the original
article or trade-mark, and purchasers knew that the infringer was the maker
and had never heard of the plaintiffs, the latter may recover profits only from-
such sales as, on direct or presumptive evidence, he can show he would have
made but for the defendant's unfair acts. 6 2 Sales under a trade name
condemned as involving unfair competition; made to persons who knew the
goods were not made by the plaintiff, or to persons who did not know of
plaintiff's existence, are assumed not to have been injurious to plaintiff.1'
Where there is no actual intent to deceive or to steal the reputation of
plaintiff's goods, and the goods were different in character and were called
by different names and were sold mainly in different places and by parties
not likely to be mistaken for each other, the Supreme Court refused to
charge the defendant with profits. "Taking all these considerations into
account, coupled with the absence of evidence that any deceit or substitution
was accomplished in fact, we find it impossible to believe that any consider-
able part of the petitioner's business was due to their goods being supposed
to be the plaintiff's hose."' 64
The Pennsylvania court has held that the duty of defendant to account
"should only cover the profits from those' sold in unfair competition with
plaintiff. We do not intend to specify under what circumstances defendant's
liability exists; this can only be properly determined on the accounting, when
the facts are fully developed. We may say, however, that a sale made in a
place where like preparations of plaintiff's were not on the market, would
not necessarily be a sale in unfair competition while one made in a place
where they were in competition, although not obtainable in the same store
as the other, would probably be so.' u 65
Equities peculiar to the cause on trial may be considered. Plaintiff-appellee
abandoned the Chicago market and deliberately kept out of it for at least
'
61 Nelson v. J. H. Winchell & Co., 203 Mass. 75, 89 N. E. 180 (1909).162Rushmore v. Badger Brass Mfg. Co., 198 Fed. 379 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912).
163W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., 103 Me. 334, 69 Atl. 569 (1907).
Profits on certain sales made by the defendant to local dealers after the change of its
name were excluded because of a finding that these dealers knew that the goods pur-
chased by them were not the product of plaintiff. Profits were excluded on sales made
to parties who never had purchased from plaintiff and did not know of plaintiff's
existence. It did not appear that the shoes were impressed with any deceptive trade-mark.
INStraus v. Notaseme Hosiery Co., 240 U. S. 179, 36 Sup. Ct 288, 289 (1916).
165 United Drug Co. v. Kovacs et al., 279 Pa. 132, 123 Atl. 654, 14 T. M. Rep. 207(1924).
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six years. "If it be assumed, therefore, that during all this time appellee
was so little interested in the Chicago territory that it did not know of
appellant's operations there, it could hardly be said that it sustained any
damage there for that time; and, if quring all that time they did not learn
that appellant's conduct at Chicago injuriously affected its trade, or the
reputation of its water and product, in any territory outside of Chicago, it
cannot be said that appellant damaged them in this respect during that time.
But when, early in 1919, appellee entered the Chicago market, a different
situation arose. It became a competitor in a market theretofore intention-
ally avoided- by it, and thereby sustained damage through the use of the
trade name by appellant."1 66
The cases differ so widely in their equities and in the circumstances in-
volved that it is almost impossible to formulate a general rule. In many cases,
plaintiff can show some instances where defendant induced consumers to
buy his goods in place of the plaintiff's goods, but it is obviously impossible
to follow all of the competitor's goods to the retail purchaser and learn what
influenced his buying of one brand instead of another. The courts now recog-
nize this and for this reason do not order an account, but award all of
defendant's profits and, in addition, damages to the extent necessary to
compensate plaintiff.
The weight of authority in both trade-mark and unfair competition cases
undoubtedly is that where it is impossible to determine what portion of the
sales were due to the infringement or to the unfair competition, plaintiff
should recover defendant's entire profits on each sale of goods bearing such
trade-mark.167 The rule as applied to patent cases was considered in the
166Morand Bros., Inc. v. Chippewa Springs Corp., 2 F. (2d) 237, 239 (C. C. A. 7th,
1924). But see Matzger et al. v. Vinikow, 17 F. (2d) 581 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927), where
it was held that the burden of proof was upon plaintiff to show that defendant had
made substantial profits attributable in whole or in part to his trade-mark, citing
Ammon & Person v. Narragansett Dairy Co., Ltd., 262 Fed. 880 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919).
In Anchor Stove Range Co. v. Rymer, 97 F. (2d) 689, 38 U. S. Pat. Q. 449 (C. C. A.
6th, 1938), the court refused to follow Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros., 240
U. S. 251, 36 Sup. Ct. 269 (1916) and award profits, since plaintiff had sought only
an injunction and an accounting for damages and on a prior appeal had not objected
to the trial court's failure to hold him entitled to defendant's profits.
167Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros., 240 U. S. 251, 36 Sup. Ct. 269 (1916);
G. C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912). This rule is stated
in the Saafield case to be in analogy to the patent cases which are reviewed in Westing-
house Electric and Manufacturing Co. v. Wagner Electric and Manufacturing Co.,
225 U. S. 604, 32 Sup. Ct. 91 (1912). The latter case holds, at page 618: "Having, by
books and other data, proved to the satisfaction of the Master the existence of profits,
the plaintiff had carried the burden irmposed by law, and established every element
necessa y to entitle it to a decree, except one. As to that, the act of the defendant
had 'hade it not merely difficult, but impossible to carry the burden of apportionment.
But plaintiff offered evidence tending to establish a legal equivalent . . . the plaintiff
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Wagner case. 168 Where there is "no substantial evidence in the case that
customers have in fact been deceived or that the defendant has realized
profits from deceptive sales or that the plaintiff has sustained any actual
damage by the defendant's competition, an accounting for profits and
damages will not be granted."' 6 9 Nor is a party entitled to an accounting
where he fails to prove any lost sales due to confusion.170 Plaintiff has the
burden of proving his lost sales and profits and that "defendant has made
profits attributable, in whole or in part, to its trade-mark."' 7t
had now presented proof to demonstrate its right to the whole of the fund because
of the fact that the defendant had inextricably commingled and confused the parts
composing it. ..One party or the other must suffer. The inseparable profit must
be given to the patentee or infringer. The loss had to fall on the innocent or the guilty.
In such an alternative the law places the loss on the wrongdoer." Quoting Callaghan
v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617, 9 Sup. Ct. 177 (1888). In Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson
Co., 138 Fed. 22 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905) the court said: "The evident intent and purpose
of the defendant was to poach on the reputation established by the Hunyadi Janos
water. It started out to get a part of the complainant's profits and it succeeded, but
we are familiar with no principle of law which will permit it to keep these profits....
It would be casting an intolerable burden upon the complainant in such cases if, after
proving the fraud, the, infringement and the profits, he were compelled to enter the
realms of speculation and prove the precise proportion of the infringers gains attributable
to his infringement."
Regis v. Jaynes & Co., 191 Mass. 245, 77 N. E. 774 (1906); Forster Mfg. Co. v.
Cutter-Tower Co., 215 Mass. 136, 101 N. E. 1083 (1913); W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v.
Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., 100 Me. 461, 62 Atl. 499 (1905) ; Modesto Creamery v. Stanis-
laus Creamery Co. et al., 168 Cal. 289, 142 Pac. 845 (1914); Capewell Horse Nail Co.
v. Green et al., 188 Fed. 20 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911); Lawrence-Williams Co. v. Societe
Enfants Gombault, 52 F. (2d) 774, 11 U. S. Pat. Q. 75 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931); J. W.
Jenkins Sons Music Co. v. Armstrong-Byrd Music Co., 4 T. M. Rep. 530 (W. D. Okla.
1913); Holley Milling Co. v. Salt Lake & Jordan M & E Co., 58 Utah 149, 197 Pac.
731, 11 T. M. Rep. (2d) 225 (1921); Kickapoo Development Co. v. Kickapoo Orchard
Co., 231 Wis. 458, 285 N. W. 354, 41 U. S. Pat. Q. 417 (1939); see also Avery v.
Meikle, 85 Ky. 435, 3 S. W. 609 (1887) ; William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. Larson, Jr., Co.,
5 F. (2d) 731 (N. D. Ill. 1925).
'
6
sWestinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. v. Wagner Electric and Manufac-
turing Co., 225 U. S. 604, 32 Sup. Ct. 691 (1912).
169W. G. Reardon Laboratories v. B & B Exterminators, 3 F. Supp. 467, 476, 17
U. S. Pat. Q. 406 (D. Md. 1933), aff'd on this point, 71 F. (2d) 515, 22 U. S. Pat.
Q. 22 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934); Ammon & Person v. Narragansett Dairy Co., 262 Fed.
880 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919) ; Pennsylvania Rubber Co. v. Dreadnaught Tire & Rubber Co.,
225 Fed. 138 (D. Del. 1915), modified on other grounds, 229 Fed. 560 (D. Del. 1916) ;
Baker v. Baker,; 115 Fed. 297 (C. C. A. 2d, 1902); American Specialty Co. v. Collis,
235 Fed. 929 (S. D. Iowa 1916). See also Allen v. Walker & Gibson, 235 Fed. 230
(N. D. N. Y. 1916).
17 0 Tillman & Bendel v. California Packing Corp., 63 F. (2d) 498, 506, 16 U. S.
Pat. Q. 332 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933); Horlick's Malted Milk Corp. v. Horluck's Inc.,
59 F. (2d) 13, 13 U. S. Pat. Q. 296 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); Gallet v. R. & G. Soap &-
Supply Co., 254 Fed. 802 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198
Fed. 369 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912).
17 1 Ammon & Person v. Narragansett Dairy Co., 262 Fed. 880 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919);
W. G. Reardon Laboratories, Inc. v. B & B Exterminators, Inc., 1 F. (2d) 515, 22
U. S. Pat. Q. 22 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934); American Specialty Co. v. Collis Co., 235
Fed. 929 (S. D. Iowa 1916).
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How to Determine the Amowznt of Profits to be Awarded
The general rule is that in assessing profits, plaintiff is required to prove
defendant's sales only and defendant must prove all the elements of cost and
expense which he claims.' 72 Rule 53(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure suggests, but does not require, a simplified procedure to deter-
mine profits, i.e., the master or court "may prescribe the form in which
the accounts 'shall be submitted," and "may require . . . a statement by a
certified public accountant who is called as a witness."
The principal cause of the complications and expense of accounting pro-
ceedings seems to be the determination, through court methods, of the profits
of defendants. That process can and does become so complicated as to
amount to a denial of justice to a plaintiff. It affords an almost ideal pre-
text to a defendant seeking by delay and technicality to force a settlement
favorable to himself from a plaintiff who has become disgusted with the diffi-
culties of obtaining prompt and effective 'relief through the courts.
Fixing the amount of net profit also requires fixing cost, often a most
complicated procedure to an expert accountant, let alone a court which" must
use the process of question and answer.
In computing the profits of a defendant to be awarded to the plaintiff,
the following deductions, among others, may be allowed: (a) the actual
cost of producing the goods, including the cost of material which is un-
avoidably wasted or spoiled in the manufacturing or distributing process;
(b) marketing costs, including the expense of promotion and advertising;
(c) interest on capital involved; (d) salaries and wages of persons em-
ployed by the defendant to produce the goods; (e) general overhead ex-
penses, including taxes within various limitations; (f) returned goods and
uncollectable accounts (these are not deductible under ordinary circum-
stances). These and many other items may enter into the determination of
what is net profit. The process is more one of accounting than of law.
Where the patent or trade-mark is used on or in connection with one of
many articles which are sold by a large corporation with large financial
resources, with plants in various -localities, employing modern methods of
advertising and selling, some of the difficulties in checking and verifying
alleged costs and expenses of manufacture and selling may be imagined.
Often it is an especially difficult matter to determine what are profits
17233 STAT. 16 (1905), 15 U. S. C. § 99 (1940); Duro Co. (of Ohio) v. Duro Co.
(of New Jersey), 56 F. (2d) 313, 12 U. S. Pat Q. 515.(C. C. A. 3d, 1932); Aladdin
Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 116 F. (2d) 708, 48 U. S. Pat. Q. 268
(C. C. A. 7th, 1941) ; Winthrop Chemical Co. v. Blackman, 159 Misc. 451, 288 N. Y.
Supp. 389 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
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where the infringing article is only a part of the defendant's business. The
rule of the United States Supreme Court in patent cases is that a ratable
proportion of the general expense in carrying on the business should be
deducted from the profits made by the use of the patented device. "We
cannot see why the general expenses incurred by the defendants in carrying
on their business, such expenses as store rent, clerk hire, fuel, gas, porterage,
etc., do not concern one part of their business as much as another. It may
be said that the selling a tremelo attachment did not add to their expenses,
and therefore that no part of those expenses should be deducted from the
price obtained for such an attachment. This is, however, but a partial view.
The store rent, the clerk hire, etc., may, it is true, have been the same ...
if instead of buying and selling one hundred organs, they had bought and
sold only ninety-nine. But will it be contended that because buying and
selling an additional organ involved no increase of the general expenses,
the price obtained for that organ above the price paid was all profit? Can
any part of the whole number sold be sihgled out as justly chargeable with
all the expenses of the business? Assuredly, no."'17 This rule has been
applied to trade-mark and unfair competition cases.174
The unlawful adventure may increase the profits without measurably in-
creasing the overall expense of the business, but any expense properly
chargeable to the unfair acts of the defendant may be deducted. There are
cases holding that to allow any such deductions, unless directly attributable
to the marketing of the articles sold under the infringing mark, or to the
use of the unfair methods, is to permit the defendant to profit by his wrong.17 5
1 ?%Tremaine v. Hitchcock & Co., 23 Wall. 518, 528, 23 L. ed. 97, 99 (U. S. 1874).
174Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack, 130 Fed. 514 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904); Saxlehner v.
Eisner & Mendelson Co., 138 Fed. 22 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905); Duro Co. (of Ohio) v.
Duro Co. (of New Jersey), 56 F. (2d) 313, 12 U. S. Pat. Q. 515 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932) ;
Cutter v. Gudebrod Bros. Co., 190 N. Y. 252, 83 N. E. 16 (1907); C. A. Briggs Co.
v. Nat'l Wafer Co., 215 Mass. 100, 102 N. E. 87 (1913); Winthrop Chemical Co. v.
Blackman, 159 Misc. 451, 288 N. Y. Supp. 389 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
175In Societe Anonyme v. Western Distilling Co., 46 Fed. 921, 922 (E. D. Mo.
1891), it was said: "When an unlawful business is carried on in connection with the
defendant's regular business, and the same agencies are employed in doing that which
is lawful and that which is unlawful, no rule of law of which I am aware requires
any deduction for expenses in estimating the profits of the unlawful business. In this
case the defendant was a distilling company. It has a place of business, a license for
doing business, traveling salesmen, etc. The proof does not convince me that any addi-
tional expenses were incurred by the defendant in the manufacture and sale of Bene-
dictine, other than such as the master has allowed. The manufacture of Benedictine
was carried on in connection with its ordinary business by the usual number of em-
ployes. The unlawful venture increased the gross profits without swelling the gross
expenses."
Again, in Regis v. Jaynes, 191 Mass. 245, 252, 77 N. E. 774, 777 (1906), "The de-
fendants in the case at bar appear to have been carrying on a large business, and they
19461
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When defendant's entire business is the manufacture and sale of the
article which invades the plaintiff's rights, the former may deduct its legiti-
mate expenses from the gross profits. But when only a part of the defend-
ant's business is involved, only a proportionate share of the overhead and
general expenses is usually deducted; together with the actual cost of the
material used in the manufacture of the offending merchandise .1 6 But this
rule is not universally followed. An early case in the Eastern District Court
in Missouri (1883) held that the defendant must prove any expense which
would not have been incurred but for the manufacture and sale of the
infringing article, and that only such expenses will be deducted from gross
profits. If the unfair competition "increased the profits without swelling the
gross expenses," no allowance will be made for the gross expenses in esti-
mating the profits of the unlawful business.177 A similar rule was applied
did not offer 'to show that their general expenses have been at all increased by their
taking up the sale of 'Rexall' goods. .... To allow them to charge upon the gross
profits from these goods any portion of the general expenses which were not increased
thereby would be to allow them to derive a direct advantage from their wrong. They
were not precluded from proving and having allowed to them the amount of any ex-
penses which were properly chargeable to these goods."
Grocers Supply-Co. v. I. Renaud Co., 234 Mass. 180, 184, 125 N. E. 144, 145, 10
T. M. Rep. 40, 41 (1919), "To allow the defendant as now urged in argument to
charge upon the gross profits any share of its general operating expenses would be
to permit it to take advantage of its own deliberate wrong when it intentionally palmed
off its goods as having been made by the plaintiff."
1761n Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack, 130 Fed. 514 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904), where an
accounting of profits was ordered the court said that "in estimating those profits we
feel concluded by the ruling of the ultimate tribunal, The Tremolo Patent, 23 Wall. 518,
23 L. ed. 97 (U. S. 1875) that, to ascertain the net profits accruing to the wrongdoer,
as in ascertaining profits in any other case, the expense of making the sale should be
deducted from the gross proceeds of the sale upon the same principle that the cost of
the spurious article is deducted from the gross receipts of its sale." See also Avery v.
Meikle, 85 Ky. 435, 3 S. W. 609 (1887) ; Cutter v. Gudebrod, 190 N. Y. 252, 83 N. E.
16 (1907); Winthrop Chemical Co. v. Blackman, 159 Misc. 451, 453, 288 N. Y. Supp.
389, 392 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Duro Co. (of Ohio) v. Duro Co. (of New Jersey), 56 F.
(2d) 313, 12 U. S. Pat. Q. 515 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932); William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v.
Larson, Jr., Co., 5 F. (2d) 731, 743 (N. D. Ill. 1925); L. P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. William
Wrigley, Jr., Co., 20 F. (2d) 830 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927).
177Societe Anonyme v. Western Distilling Co., 46 Fed. 921, 922 (E. D. Mo. 1891).
N. K. Fairbank Co. v. Windsor et aL., 118 Fed. 96, 98 (W. D. N. Y. 1902) followed
Societe Anonyme v. Western Distilling Co., supra, but the decree was reversed, though
on other grounds, the Circuit Court of Appeals holding that plaintiff was not entitled
to any profits or damages. N. K. Fairbank Co. v. Windsor et aL., 124 Fed. 200 (C. C. A.
2d, 1903). In New York the rule of Societe Anonyme v. Western Distilling Co. has
been disregarded. Winthrop Chemical Co. v. Blackman, 159 Misc. 451, 453, 288 N. Y.
Supp. 389, 392 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
In Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack, 130 Fed. 514 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904) it was pointed
out that the decision in Societe Ahonyme v. Western Distilling Co., mupra, contains no
reference to the Tremolo Patent case and the rule of that case was held to govern
the situation.
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by the Massachusetts Court in 1906,178 but in a later decision (1913), the
deductions were limited to the special circumstances involved,'1 79 although it
recognized the rule of the Trenwlo Patent case.
The general expenses which may be deducted in ascertaining net profits
include the wages or salaries of employees and managing officers; also
machinery, tools, rent, cost of power, advertising expense, interest on in-
vested capital, depreciation, the expense of a cost system, profit-sharing
coupons and lost accounts, etc.180 The expenses of salesmen who sell goods
178Regis v. Jaynes, 191 Mass. 245, 77 N. E. 774 (1906). See also Nelson v. J. H.
Winchell & Co., 203 Mass. 75, 89 N. E. 180 (1909); Grocers Supply Co. v. Renaud
Co., 234 Mass. 180, 184, 125 N. E. 144, 146 (1919), "To allow the defendant, as now
urged in argument to charge upon the gross profits any share of its general operating
expenses would be to permit it to take advantage of its own deliberate wrong when it
intentionally palmed off its goods as having been made by the plaintiff."
179C. A. Briggs v. National Wafer Co., 215 Mass. 100, 102 N. E. 87 (1913) where
it is said: "It appears from the master's report that the defendant has made substantial
profits from its sales of goods bearing the plaintiff's label or an imitation thereof, un-
less a deduction is made of a part of its general expenses to be determined by appor-
tioning them in the ratio which its sales of Boston Wafers bear to its total sales. If
such a deduction is made, the defendant has obtained no profits from the sales in question.
"It has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States that such a deduction
should be made in ascertaining the profits realized by the infringer of a patent. The
Tremolo Patent, 23 Wall. 518, 23 L. ed..97 (U. S. 1875). The same rule has been
followed since that decision in trade-mark cases and cases of unfair competition, some
of which are collected in Regis v. Jaynes & Co., 191 Mass. 245, 77 N. E. 774 (1906).
In the last named case this court declined to follow the rule of the Tremolo Patent,
deeming it inapplicable to the facts before the court. In the Regis Case, the defendants
were carrying on a large business, of which their dealings in goods bearing the plaintiff's
trade-mark constituted only a small part, and the defendant's general expenses did not
appear to have been at all increased by those dealings. Here the defendant's dealings
in Boston Wafers have been a substantial and integral part of its entire wafer and
lozenge business, averaging about 10 per cent thereof; and its general expenses were
incurred for this department and its increase and extension just as for any part of its
business. The defendant has used considerable and cumulative effort to push and in-
crease these sales, very probably more than it has applied to other parts of its business.
While there is no direct evidence on the subject, it seems to manifest to us, looking at
the master's report, that the defendant's general expenses have been at least propor-
tionately increased by this department. The rule adopted in the Tremolo Patent is
the general rule, to be applied where special circumstances do not make its application
unjust."
280The Providence Rubber Company v. Charles Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788, 19 L. ed. 566
(U. S. 1869) a patent infringement case, has been followed on this question. For a
detailed discussion of the allocation of expenses and the amortization of institutional
advertising and the allocation of contingent liabilities for unredeemed profit-sharing
coupons, see L. P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 20 F. (2d) 830
(C. C. A. 7th, 1927) and in the decision below, William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. Larson,
Jr., Co., 5 F. (2d) 731 (N. D. Ill. 1925) the Circuit Court of Appeals allowed a
deduction of federal income and excess profits taxes, but as to this the Supreme Court
reversed the decree. L. P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U. S. 97,
48 Sup. Ct. 449 (1928). See also Avery v. Meikle, 85 Ky. 435, 3 S. W. 609 (1889);
Globe-Wernicke Co. v. Safe Cabinet Co., 110 Ohio St. 609, 144 N. E. 711, 15 T. M.
REp. 14 (1924); Lever Brothers v. J. Eavenson & Sons, Inc., 261 App. Div. 584, 585,
26 N. Y. S. (2d) 649, 650, 49 U. S. Pat. Q. 570 (lst Dep't 1941). Saxlehner v.
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other than those complained of should not be charged exclusively against
the profits from the goods complained of, and where some individual in
defendant's organization causes defendant to continue the use of an in-
fringing symbol and to gamble on the outcome of the litigation, his salary
is not deductible.181
In 1941 in the Alacdtin case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that although an individual was the dominant force in the defendant corpo-
ration and responsible for its torts, the court was not dealing with punitive
damages but with actual profits and the salary was deducted. This decision
seems contrary to that of the Maine Court in 1907 in the Lynn Shoe case.
There, "The defendant corporation claimed that in determining its profits
made in unfair competition with the plaintiff, there should be included in the
cost of manufacture and sale the sums paid as salaries for services to Mr.
Lynn, its president and one of its three directors, and to Mr. Lunn, its
treasurer and another of its three directors ...
"If the bill and the claims made under the bill were against Lynn and
Lunn as a form of partnership, it is clear that the value of their time,
talent and services expended in wronging the plaintiff by unfair competition
should not be deducted from the plaintiff's damages. To do so would com-
Eisner & Mendelson Co., 138 Fed. 22 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905) ; Dickinson v. 0. & W. Thum
Co., 8 F. (2d) 570, 573 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925); Duro Co. (of Ohio) v. Duro Co., (of
New Jersey), 56 F. (2d) 313, 12 U. S. Pat. Q. 515 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932). In Coca
Cola Co. v. Nashville Syrup Co., 215 Fed. 527 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914) the salary of the
general manager and organizer of a corporation was allowed as a disbursement, the
general manager being a minority stockholder, and no claim being made by the. com-
plainant that the corporation was a mere sham or subterfuge.
851In Duro Co. (of Ohio) v. Duro Co. (of New Jersey), 56 F. (2d) 313, 315, 12
U. S. Pat. Q. 515 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932), it was found by the master that "after the
suit was started, it was Mr. Robert M. Perkins (perhaps with the advice of Mr. M. G.
Perkins] who decided to continue the use of the trade-mark 'Duro,' and to take the
chances on the outcome of the suit. He had full knowledge that the plaintiff objected
to that use. His action was intentional. He was responsible for the infringement of
the plaintiff's trade-mark by the defendant company. While it does not appear that he
acted in bad faith, his use of the plaintiff's trade-mark was found by this Court to be
wrongful .... To permit the defendant to deduct his salary or part of its costs, would
be to require the plaintiff to pay him a salary for doing intentional wrongful acts in
violation of the plaintiff's rights." See also Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of
America, 116 F. (2d) 708, 713, 48 U. S. Pat. Q. 268 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941), where it
was contended that the salary paid to one of the officers should not have been allowed
as a deduction because "he was the dominant force responsible for appellee's torts."
The court said: "But we are not dealing now with punitive damages but rather with
actual profits. The amount deducted as salary was actually paid Sachsteder for the
management and conduct of the business and in determining the actual profits for which
appellee should account, we must credit all costs. Salaries paid to officers are proper
deductions." Likewise in Nashville Syrup Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 215 Fed. 527, 533
(C. C. A. 6th, 1914), the salary of the general manager and organizer of a corporation
was allowed as a disbursement, the general manager being a minority stockholder, and
no claim being made that the corporation was a sham or subterfuge.
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pel the plaintiff to pay them for wronging it. . . . If Lynn and Lunn
were nothing more than servants, or even managing officers, of the corpo-
ration acting under the directors and had no other connection with the
wrongs done the plaintiff, there might be some force in the argument. But
the record before us discloses that in fact the corporation was practically
the servant of Lynn and Lunn, not they its servants. They organized it,
directed it, set it and kept it in unfair competition with the plaintiff. The
wrong to the plaintiff was conceived, brought forth and nurtured by them.
Whether they wrought the wrong as individuals, or as a partnership, or as
a corporation, they were the real wrongdoers. The court should penetrate
through the form to the substance. The exception must be overruled.' 18 2
Extraordinary salaries, which actually are profits under another name, may
not be deducted.18 3
The Supreme Court has refused to allow the deduction of federal income
and excess profits taxes, saying that no doubt there are cases in which such
a deduction would be proper, and that while it would be unjust to charge
an infringer with the gross amount of his sales without allowing him for
the materials and labor that were necessary to produce the things sold,
". it does not follow that he should be allowed what he paid for the chance
to do what he knew that he had no right to do."'18 4 Hence where a defendant
has been guilty of conscious and deliberate wrongdoing, he should not be
allowed to deduct federal income and excess profits taxes, particularly where
plaintiff will have to pay a tax on the infringer's profits when he receives
them.
The Massachusetts Court treats sales which involve actual losses because
of bad debts as if they had not been made, neither increasing nor diminishing
the amount on account of such losses. 8 5
182W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., 103 Me. 334, 69 AUt. 569 (1907),
citing Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617, 663-664, 9 Sup. Ct. 177, 190-191 (1888), a
copyright infringement case. See also Duro Co. (of Ohio) v. Duro Co. (of New Jersey),
56 F. (2d) 313, 315, 12 U. S. Pat. Q. 515 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932).
'
8 3The Providence Rubber Co. v. Charles Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788, 19 L. ed. 566 (U. S.
1869), a patent infringement case; Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America,
116 F. (2d) 708, 713, 48 U. S. Pat. Q. 268 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
18 4L. P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U. S. 97, 100, 48 Sup. Ct.
449 (1928). "Even if the only relief that the Wrigley Company can get is a deduction
from gross income where the amount of its liability is finally determined, the Larson
Company will have to pay a tax on the Wrigley profits when it receives them, and
in a case of what has been found to have been one of conscious and deliberate wrong-
doing, we think it just that the further deduction should not be allowed." See also
Aladdin v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 116 F. (2d) 708, 714, 48 U. S. Pat. Q. 268(C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
185Nelson v. Winchell & Co., 203 Mass. 75, 89 N. E. 180 (1909), following Edel-
stein v. Edelstein, 10 L. T. (N. s.) 780, 1 De G. & S. (Ch.) 185 (1863). In Duro Co.
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The burden of proving expenses to be deducted rests on the infringer.186
If they were incurred in good faith, they may be allowed even though they
may have been unwise and improvident and may have resulted in a con-
siderable reduction, perhaps in the extinguishment of recoverable net profits.
They must, however, be adequately proved. Where a statement of manu-
facturing costs is "so indefinite and uncertain . . . as to render it utterly
impossible to determine with any approach to accuracy any approximation
of the profits," none of the items of cost could be allowed.'
8 7
Sometimes the Court will permit finished goods labeled with the infringing
marks, which were on hand at the date of the filing of the opinion, to be
sold. "The permission to sell was in order to save the defendant from the
destruction of this investment. In availing himself of that privilege he was
charged with the duty of keeping that stock and the cost and expense of
marketing it, separate from his other operations. He should and must have
known that he was entitled to no deductions from the sale price except such
as were incident to the making of such sales and as pertained strictly to
these goods .... In lieu of any definite record, defendant's expert undertook
to apportion the disputed items, using as a basis average inventory or number
of cases sold. All agree that separation could be made in no other way.
In our opinion, the master was right in refusing to accept this substituted
method and in applying the rules of law applicable to a wrongdoer who
knowingly confuses and commingles trust property with his own so that no
separation can be later made."' 88
Where, due to the infringer's fault, no direct evidence of his expenses can
be procured, and there is evidence that his costs were similar to plaintiff's
(of Ohio) v. Duro Co. (of New Jersey), 56 F. (2d) 313, 315, 12 U. S. Pat. Q. 515
(C. C. A. 3d, 1932), the court refused to deduct a sum of money stolen by an employee.
's 6Winthrop Chemical Co. v. Blackman, 159 Misc. 451, 453, 288 N. Y. Supp. 389,
392 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Miles Laboratories, Inc., v. American Pharmaceutical Company
et al., 261 App. Div. 108, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 405, 33 T. M. Rep. 14 (1st Dep't 1941).
The rule generally adopted as to the burden of proof is the rule provided by the United
States Statute for registration of trade-marks, 33 STAT. 724, 729 (1905), 15 U. S. C.§ 99 (1940). See Mishataka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316
U. S. 203, 205, 206, 62 Sup. Ct. 1022, 1024, 53 U. S. Pat. Q. 323 (1942) ; Dickinson v.
0. & W. Thum Co., 8 F. (2d) 570, 573 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925); Duro Co. (of Ohio) v.
Duro Co. (of New Jersey), 56 F. (2d) 313, 315, 12 U. S. Pat. Q. 515 (C. C. A. 3d,
1922) ; Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 116 F. (2d) 708, 712, 48 U. S.
Pat. Q. 268 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) ; Obear-Nester v. United Drug Co., 53 F. Supp. 744,
60 U. S. Pat. Q. 171 (E. D. Mo. 1944).
'
87Howard Dustless Duster Co. v. Carleton, 244 Fed. 881, 884 (D. Conn. 1916);
L. P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 20 F. (2d) 830, 832 (C. C. A. 7th,
1927). 1188Dickenson v. 0. & W. Thum Co., 8 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
[Vol. 32
UNFAIR COMPETITION
it may be inferred that the infringer's expenses were substantially the same
as plaintiff's during the period of the accounting1
8 9
In New York, in Conviser v. Brownstone & Co.,190 the trial justice took
the amount of sales which plaintiff was able to prove had been made by
defendant to plaintiff's customers and allowed the profit which plaintiff
would have made from the sales. "It is not what profit, if any, the wrongdoer
made, it is the profit the lawful owner would have made if his property
had not been stolen. The rights of the owner are not limited by the rogue's
manipulation of the stolen property." This statement should be considered
in connection with the rule that when the facts cannot be shown, all of
defendant's profits go to plaintiff.
When the entire business of the defendant consists of the manufacture
and sale of the article involved, he may deduct from his gross profits his
legitimate expenses, 191 and losses actually sustained because of bad debts, or
otherwise. 192 Interest on capital used in the production of the infringing
article may be deducted as an operating expense.' 93 The expense of notices
's
9 Trappey v. Mcllhenny Co., 12 F. (2d) 19, 21 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926). See also
Scoville Mfg. Co. v. U. S. Electric Mfg. Corp., 47 F. Supp. 619, 621, 55 U. S. Pat. Q. 281
(S. D. N. Y. 1942). In Nelson v. Winchell & Co., 203 Mass. 75, 80 N. E. 180 (1909), it
was held that a cost sheet of defendants might be used by a master as evidence of
the cost of shoes manufactured by them in absence of explicit evidence to the contrary.
190209 App. Div. 584, 205 N. Y. Supp. 82 (2d Dep't 1924), aff'g, 120 Misc. 92, 197
N. Y. Supp. 682 (Sup. Ct. 1922). In Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack, 130 Fed. 514, 520
(C. C. A. 7th, 1904), "It does not seem quite just that the wrongdoer should be per-
mitted to escape without pecuniary loss to himself, and yet we must remember that
here the appellant has chosen to prove, as the basis of recovery, merely the profits which
the wrongdoer has made, and in estimating those profits we feel concluded by the ruling
of the ultimate tribunal, The Tremolo Patent, 23 Wall. 518, 23 L. ed. 97 (U. S. 1875)
that, to ascertain the net profits accruing to 'the wrongdoer, as in ascertaining profits
in any other case, the expense of making the sale should be deducted from the gross
proceeds of the sale, upon the same principle that the cost of the spurious article is
deducted from the gross receipts of its sale." See supra note 176.
191 Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack, 130 Fed. 514 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904) ; Nelson v. J. M.
Winchell & Co., 203 Mass. 75, 89 N. E. 180 (1909) (Holding that a cost sheet of
defendants may be used by a master, as evidence of the cost of shoes manufactured
by them, in absence of explicit evidence to the contrary). Regis v. Jaynes, 191 Mass.
245, 77 N. E. 774 (1906); W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., 103 Me.
334, 69 Atl. 569 (1907). In Avery v. Meikle, 85 Ky. 435, 3 S. W. 609 (1887), the cost
of material, hire of employees, expenses of selling and advertising and the value of
the labor and superintendance of the work by defendants were all held to be deductible
as expenses. See also J. W. Jenkins' Sons Music Co. v. Armstrong-Byrd Music Co.,
4 T. M. Rep. 530 (W. D. Okla. 1913).
'
9 2 W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., 103 Me. 334, 69 Atl. 569 (1907);
Edelstein v. Edelstein, 1 DeG. & S. 185, 10 L. T. (N. s.) 780; Nelson v. J. M. Winchell
& Co., 203 Mass. 75, 89 N. E. 180 (1909).
'
9 3 Globe-Wernicke Co. v. Safe-Cabinet Co., 110 Ohio St. 609, 144 N. E. 711, 15
T. M. Rep. 14 (1924); William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. Larson, Jr., Co., 5 F. (2d) 731
(N. D. Ili. 1925), aff'd, 20 F. (2d) 830 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927) ; Lawrence-Williams Co.
v. Societe Enfants Gombault, 52 F. (2d) 774, 11 U. S. Pat. Q. 75 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931).
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sent by plaintiff to its customers to correct misapprehensions caused by de-
fendant's acts are proper damages, as is the cost of defending vexatious
suits brought against plaintiff as a part of a conspiracy to injure plaintiff
by unfair competition.'9 4
In Larson v. Wrigley, the infringer spent large sums advertising several
brands including the infringing one. The master charged off one-fourth of
a large part of this advertising cost each year as the advertising cost for
that year on the theory that although the advertisement was contracted and
paid for the first year, it was effective as an advertisement for four years.
The Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and said that "the expense for this ad-
vertising had been contracted and paid for in good faith and however it may
have been wholly or partly unearned at the close of the accounting period,
it was none the less an expense which should be deducted in fixing the net
profits" on the infringing product. "Where the injured party seeks the
profits of an infringer, he takes the chance of their reduction, or even
extinguishment, through expenses and losses actually incurred, however un-
wisely or even improvidently, so long only as they were incurred in good
faith."195
The rules to be applied where defendant is guilty of contempt are discussed
by Judge Bright in John B. Stetson v. Stephen L. Stetson Co., Ltd.Y
96
Period of Time During Which Profits May Be Recovered
No account will be ordered of sales innocently made prior to notice; sales
made after notice must be accounted for.197 One who believes his rights
are invaded is entitled to a reasonable time after first learning of the in-
fringement to investigate the facts and' be sure that his information is
correct before his failure to give notice has any bearing on his rights, but
within a reasonable time after he has such information he will do well to
warn the invader. Failure to do so, however, has no bearing on his right
to an injunction. 98
19 4Potter Press v. Potter, 303 Mass. 485, 22 N. E. (2d) 68 (1939). But see Buchanan
v. Carpenter, 19 R. I. 337, 36 Atl. 90 (1896).
10520 F. (2d) 830, 832 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927). In Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp
Co. of America, 116 F. (2d) 708, 714, 48 U. S. Pat. Q. 268 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941), the
court allowed the costs of advertising and of an advertising campaign to be deducted as
a business expense in determining profits. "Even though the methods employed in
realizing gains were not proper, yet they were a part of the costs of realization from
sales from which the profits resulted."
19658 F. Supp. 586, 64 U. S. Pat. Q. 153 (1944).
19 7Liberty Oil Corp. v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 270 Mich. 187, 258 N. W. 241 (1935).
39 SWorcester Brewing Corp. v. Rueter, 157 Fed. 217 (C. C. A. 1st, 1907) ; The
International Silver Co. v. Win. H. Rogers Corp., 66 N. J. Eq. 140, 57 Atl. 725
(Ch. 1904).
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One who continues use of a mark after notice of infringement subjects
himself to the risk that the claim of infringement is well founded and he
may become liable for profits and damages accruing or sustained there-
after.199 If a trade-mark is knowingly infringed, an accounting will run
from the beginning of its use by defendant.20  Interest on profits runs
from the date of notice.20' Where a complainant did not begin suit until
more than a year after defendant was organized and went into business,
did not notify defendant of its intention to proceed against it, and during
this interval defendant expended large sums in developing its business, no
accounting for profits was ordered. The complainant "should not be per-
mitted to stand by, knowing that defendant is devoting its money and efforts
to building up a business, wait until after he has made profits, and then
come in and demand them as its own.' '20 2 But where such a notice is given
promptly, a considerable delay in bringing suit, especially if negotiations
for settlement are going on, is not laches. 20 3
If the plaintiff fails to attach the required statutory notice of registration
to his goods or packages, and an action is brought in a federal court be-
tween citizens of the same state and jurisdiction is based solely on federal
registration, no profits or damages may be recovered for the period prior
to the giving of notice of infringement. 20 4 But if a suit is brought both
for trade-mark infringement and unfair competition and comes within the
rule of Hurn v. Oursler,2° 5 damages for unfair competition based on profits
made prior to notice of infringement may be awarded. However, in a suit
brought for trade-mark infringement and unfair competition where there
was no diversity of citizenship, and hence jurisdiction rested on the statute,
profits made prior to the registration of plaintiff's trade-mark and prior to
notice of iniringement were not awarded because there was no jurisdiction
199Dickey v. Metro Pictures Corp., 164 N. Y. Supp. 788, 7 T. M. Rep. 322 (Sup. Ct.
1917); Liberty Oil Corp. v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 270 Mich. 187, 258 N. W. 241,
25 T. M. Rep. 124 (1935). See also Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S.
Kresge Co., 119 F. (2d) 316, 49 U. S. Pat. Q. 419 (C. C. 'A. 6th, 1941) ; Wallace &
Co. v. Repetti, Inc., 266 Fed. 307 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920).20ORamopa Co. v. A. Gastun & Co., 278 Fed. 557 (S. D. N. Y. 1922).201Duro Co. (of Ohio) v. Duro Co. (of New Jersey), 56 F. (2d) 313, 12 U. S. Pat.
Q. 515 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932).202The International Silver Co. v. Win. H. Rogers Corp., 66 N. J. Eq. 140, 57 At.
725 (Ch. 1904).203Nelson v. Winchell & Co., 203 Mass. 75, 89 N. E. 180 (1909).204Stark Bros. Co. v. Stark, 255 U. S. 50, 41 Sup. Ct. 221 (1921) ; Treasure Imports
v. Henry Amdur & Sons, 40 F. Supp. 880, 50 U. S. Pat. Q. 192 (S. D. N. Y. 1941),
aff'd, 127 F. (2d) 3, 52, U. S. Pat. Q. 598 (C. C. A. Zd, 1942). See 33 STAT. 730
(1905), 15 U. S. C. § 107 (1940).
205289 U. S. 238, 53 Sup. Ct. 586 (1933). See also Rossmann v. Gamier, 211 Fed.
401, 407 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914).
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over the unfair competition claim even under ihe doctrine of Hurn v.
Oursler.20° The Second Circuit Court of Appeals'affirmed a decree denying
plaintiff's recovery for unfair competition for failure of proof. One circuit
judge, however, disagreed with the lower court's finding that it was without
jurisdiction, while the other two judges, in a separate opinion, considered
that the District Court did not have jurisdiction of the claim of unfair
competition by reason of acts committed prior to the date of registration
of plaintiff's trade-mark. There may be doubt whether the rule of the Stark
case, 20 7 that no damages will be awarded resulting from unfair competition
prior to registration of the plaintiff's trade-mark, remains in .force today.208
"The facts are that the term 'certified' as applied to bread was first em-
ployed by plaintiff's intestate; that defendant was notified of his claim to
the exclusive use of the term in 1923, and knew of its use before that time,
and that, in disregard of the claim of the plaintiff and her intestate, it has
continued to use the term. It took the chance of its continued use, and, under
these circumstances, the legal rights of the parties should be determined
without regard to what the defendant did in the way of expenditures after
it knew of the claim of the plaintiff's intestate."2 0 9
Where No Accounting Will Be Ordered
The question as to whether of not the court should order either an account-
ing for profits or a proceeding to determine the amount of an award of
damages seems to be based on so many considerations as to make it largely
a matter of discretion. 210 The decision may rest on whether such proceed-
ings are "appropriate and necessary"; or whether a substantial recovery
is likely;211 or whether a sufficient number of instances of deception are
2O06Treasure Imports v. Henry Amdur & Sons, 40 F. Supp. 880, 50 U. S. Pat. Q.
192 (S. D. N. Y. 1941), aff'd, 127 F. (2d) 3, 52 U. S. Pat. Q. 598 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
See also Petersime Incubator Co. v. Bundy Incubator Co, 34 U. S. Pat Q. 251 (S. D.
Ohio 1937), aff'd, 93 F. (2d) 936, 36 U. S. Pat. Q. 519 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937).207Stark Bros. v. Stark, 255 U. S. SO, 41 Sup. Ct. 221 (1921).2OSTreasure Imports v. Henry Amdur & Sons, 40 F. Supp. 880, 50 U. S. Pat. Q.
192 (S. D. N. Y. 1941), aff'd, 127 F. (2d) 3, 52 U. S. Pat. Q. 598 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) ;
Foster D. Snell Inc. v. Potters, 88 F. (2d) 611, 33 U. S. Pat. Q. 112 (C. C. A. 2d,
1937) ; L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. (2d) 272, 22 U. S. Pat. Q. 268 (C. C. A.
2d, 1934); Slaymaker Lock Co. v. Reese, 24 F. Supp. 69, 38 U. S. Pat Q. 83 (E. D.
Pa. 1938).
1 209Lammes v. Ward Brothers Co., Inc., 134 Misc. 288, 290, 235 N. Y. Supp. 93, 95
(Sup. Ct. 1929).21OHaslinghuis v. P. Harrington Sons, 237 Fed. 301 (D. C. N. H. 1916).211Coca-Colk Co. v. Cleo Syrup Corp., 54 F. Supp. 665, 61 U. S. Pat. Q. 510 (E. D.
Mo. 1944). 1
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likely to be shown, 12 or whether the wrongful use was accidental ;213 or
whether it continued for a sufficiently long time without protest ;214 or
whether the wrongful act was innocent or accidental ;215 and many others.
The following are some of the reasons for refusal of an accounting:
I. Where Others Than the Plaintiff Have a Right to Receive the Profits
Defendant's profits will not be awarded to the plaintiff after the latter,
by contract, gave to a third party the right to distribute plaintiff's trade-,
mark product exclusively. Since the contract carried with it the right to
recover profits arising after its date thereof, it was the third party who
would have realized the profits if it had not been for the infringement. 216
Where the owner of a trade-mark was a jobber and never expected to
get a manufacturer's profits, the defendant was not liable for the manu-
facturing profits.
21 7
II. Where There Is Difficulty of Computation
The Pennsylvania Court states the general principle thus: "... defend-
ant's wrongful conduct has occasioned the trouble and it must bear all the
burdens growing out of that fact. It would be intolerable if one could wrong
another and escape all liability, because it was difficult to prove the amount
of the loss." 218 But various cases hold that an accounting may be denied
where there is no theory on which a substantial recovery may be based nor
a rational rule of damages applied, or where an attempt to separate defend-
ant's legitimate profits from his illegitimate profits would be futile and
based on speculation and conjecture. 21 9 Under such a rule any compensation
to plaintiff may depend upon the degree of stealth with which defendant
manipulates his imitation of plaintiff's symbols or makes use of plaintiff's
212J. C. Penney v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F. (2d) 949, 50 U. S. Pat. Q. 165
(C. C. A. 8th, 1941).213Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge & Co., 119 F. (2d) 316,
49 U. S. Pat. Q. 419 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941) .
214H. A. Metz Laboratories v. American Pharmaceutical Co., 18 F. Supp. 598, 33
U. S. Pat. Q. 426, 27 T. M. Rep. 368 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).215Regis v. Jaynes & Co., 191 Mass. 245, 77 N. E. 774 (1906) ; Mishawaka Rubber
& Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 119 F. (2d) 316, 49 U. S. Pat. Q. 419 (C. C. A.
6th, 1941).216Lavrence-Williams Co. v. Societe Enfants Gombault, 52 F. (2d) 774, 11 U. S.
Pat Q. 75 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931). See also Clark Thread Co. v. Win. Clark Co., 56 N. J.
Eq. 789, 40 AtI. 686 (1898). See also Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Bournonville, 260 Fed. 446,
448 (D. N. J. 1916).217Nelson v. Winchell & Co., 203 Mass. 75, 89 N. E. 180 (1909).218United Drug Co. v. Kovacs, 279 Pa. 132, 137, 123 Atl. 654, 655, 14 T. M. Rep.
207 (1924).219Giragosian v. Chutjian, 194 Mass. 504, 80 N. E. 647 (1907) ; Bp~rnett v. Leuchars,
13 L. T. R. (N. s.) 495 (1865).
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reputation and good-will and is able to conceal his profits. Where such
conditions are found,' it should not be difficult for equity to find a basis for
an award of damages that will repair the wrong that has been committed.
In Oregon, where defendant took the name of plaintiff and used it in
the same business, the Court decided that "there is no satisfactory basis in
the evidence for an accounting and that relief, therefore, will be denied."
The result was that defendant's experiment in piracy of good-will cost him
nothing.220
In the State of Washington, where plaintiffs used the word "Orpheum"
on signs to designate their theater, and the defendants' signs led people to
believe that theirs was a theater of the plaintiffs rather than one in which
the Orpheum Circuit vaudeville was being given, defendant was held for
unfair competition and the signs removed, but no damages were allowed
because "so many uncertain elements are involved in determining the extent
of plaintiffs' damage, occasioned by the acts of defendant that it is impossible
to fix any definite award. ' 22 1
In a New Jersey case, the defendant cut timber on the plaintiff's land,
some before the suit was brought and some after. Plaintiff was nonsuited
because the jury on the evidence could not measure accurately the damage
recoverable. On appeal, the Court said that "where actionable misconduct
is shown on the part of the defendant on the breach of a covenant, the law
implies nominal damages at the least."222
III. Where the Profits Are Likely to Be Insignificant
Where the sales of a defendant are small, he should not be required to
account for gains and profits,223 and where "there is no evidence of lost
sales . . plaintiff is not entitled even to an accounting of damages." 224
Where there is little probability that evidence of any substantial number of
sales due to defendant's conduct can be shown, before subjecting defendant
to the burden of a reference, plaintiff may be required to satisfy the court
of its ability to establish some actual material customer deception. The
2oH. Milgrim & Bros., Inc. v. Schlesinger et al., 168 Ore. Rep. 476, 123 P. (2d)
196, 53 U. S. Pat. Q. 183 (1942).
22'New York Life Ins. Co. et al. v. Orpheum Theatre & Realty Co. et al., 100 Wash.
573, 171 Pac. 534 (1918).222Peter Lance et al. v. Nathan L. Apgar, 60 N. J. L. 447, 448, 38 Atl. 695 (1897).
223Saxlehner v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 179 U. S. 42, 21 Sup. Ct. 16 (1900).224Horlick's Malted Milk Corp. v. Horluck's Inc., 59 F. (2d) 13, 17, 13 U. S. Pat.
Q. 296 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932), quoting Denison, 3. in Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson
Co., 300 Fed. 509, 512 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924). See also Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Elliott,
7 Fed. (2d) 962 (,. C. A. 3d, 1925); Gallet v. R. & G. Soap & Supply Co., 254 Fed.
802, 804 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
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certainty of some damage must, as in any other case, be established, for
"equity will not delve into the realm of purely nominal damages."122
In an old case where it appeared that the amount of damages or profits
was likely to prove insignificant,225 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals said:
"We see no reason to differ with the Circuit Court in its refusal to order
an accounting. If we could discover any theory upon which a substantial
recovery might be had, we would not hesitate to direct a reference, but it
is plain that such a proceeding will prove abortive after subjecting both
parties to large additional expense and the defendants to unnecessary annoy-
ance. The master would be involved in an inextricable tangle from which
it will be impossible to emerge with a substantial recovery based upon a
rational rule of damages. . . .An attempt to segregate the profits, if ftny,
resultitig from the illegitimate use of the word would require an excursion
into the realms of conjecture and speculation without hope of any tangible
result. ' 227 This case has created discussion and is still cited in support of
the view that if difficulty is likely to exist in ascertaining the infringer's
profits, no accounting will be ordered.228
In 1918, the same court again ruled to the same effect. "An accounting
will not be ordered, unless it is clear that either upon the record, or upon
225 .T.S. Co. v. Tee Pee Rubber Co., 288 Fed. 794, 798 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923), citing
Straus v. Notaseme Co., 240 U. S. 179, 182, 36 Sup. Ct. 288 (1916) ; J. C. Penney Co.
v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F. (2d) 949, 958, 50 U. S. Pat. Q. 165 (C. C. A. 8th,
1941).22 6 Ludington Novelty Co. v. Leonard, 127 Fed. 155 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903); Giragosian
v. Chutjian, 194 Mass. 504, 80 N. E. 647 (1907); Barnett v. Leuchars, 13 L. T. R.
(N. s.) 495 (1865). Regis v. Jaynes & Co., 191 Mass. 245, 77 N. E. 774 (1906), states:
"If it appears that the amount of damage to the plaintiff or of profits realized by the
defendant is only insignificant, or that no actual damage has been sustained, the court
may confine its relief to an injunction against any future infringement." Saxlehner v.
Siegel-Cooper Co., 179 U. S. 42, 21 Sup. Ct. 16 (1900); Little v. Kellam, 100 Fed.
353, 355 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1900); Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. Ltd. v. Walker, 115
Fed. 822, 823 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1902).
22 7Ludington Novelty Co. v. Leonard, 127 Fed. 155 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903) ; Kessler &
Co. v. Goldstrom, 177 Fed. 392 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910); Hennessey v. Wine Growers'
Ass'n., 212 Fed. 308 (S. D. N. Y. 1914); Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell,
Co., 244 Fed. 508, 522 (D. Conn. 1917), aff'd, 250 Fed. 960 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918);
O'Sullivan Rubber Co. v. Genuine Rubber Co., 281 Fed. 851 (D. Mass. 1922), re'v'd
on other grounds but aff'd. on this, 287 Fed. 134 (C. C. A. 1st, 1923) ; Baker v. Master
Printers Union of New Jersey, 34 F. Supp. 808, 47 U. S. Pat. Q. 69 (D. N. J. 1940) ;
Societe Anonyme v. Cordial Panna Co., 8 T. M. Rep. 128 (N. D. Ohio 1917); Simmons
Co. v. Royal Bedding Co., 5 F. Supp. 946 (W. D. Pa. 1933)2 2 8 Kessler & Co. v. Goldstrom, 177 Fed. 392 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910) ; Hennessey v. Wine-
Growers Ass'n., 212 Fed. 308, 309 (S. D. N. Y. 1914). See Merriam v. Ogilvie, 170
Fed. 167, 169-170 (C. C. A. 1st, 1909); Dr. A. Reed Cushion Shoe Co. v. Frew, 158
Fed. 552 (C. C. W. D. N. Y. 1908); Keystone Type Foundry v. Portland Pub. Co.,
180 Fed. 301, 304 (C. C. D. Me. 1910); Peninsular Chemical Co. v. Levinson, 247
Fed. 658 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917); Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 244
Fed. 508, 522 (D. Conn. 1917), aff'd, 250 Fed. 960 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
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a record which the appellants might present to the master, there could be a
substantial recovery." 22 9 In Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 23 0 the
Sixth Circuit. Court said: "However, we find no satisfactory basis for an
accounting against either the manufacturer or retailer for profits or damages.
The case is peculiarly one where such damage as has occurred, like that
which is still in prospect, is incapable of computation. We see no reason-
able probability that any substantial damages could be proved and reduced
to dollars and cents with that degree of accuracy that is essential in such
a case." Here plaintiff sold a magazine and defendant sold millinery and
hence there could hardly be any lost sales.
Where there is damage but it is impossible to trace it to the defendant,
an accounting and damages will not be awarded, but if the infringer pur-
posely so keeps his books as to conceal his profits, the strictness of the
rules of evidence to be applied to proof of profits will be substantially
diminished.2 3
Other cases hold, hbwever, that a plaintiff is entitled to his day in court
and achance to prove his damages and show defendant's profits if he can.
In 1911 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals took this position, saying:
"This is not a case where this court or the Circuit Court can say in advance
that the complainant will be unable to establish the amount of the gains and
profits which the defendants have made by reason of the unfair methods
employed by them in dressing up their brushes to resemble the complainant's
brushes. Except in those cases where the court is convinced that such
proof is impossible, an accounting should be ordered. . . .That the com-
plainant's task seems difficult and the result an inadequate return for time
and labor expended is not now important. The complainant is entitled to
its hearing before the master; if it fails in its proof the Circuit Court
will deal with the situation as to costs and expenses when it enters the final
decree." 23 2
229Gallet v. R. & G. Soap & Supply Co., 254 Fed. 802, 805 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
20300 Fed. 509, 512 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924) ; Estate Stove Co. v. Gray & Dudley Co.,
41 F. (2d) 462, 6 U. S. Pat. Q. 20 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930), rev'd on other grounds,, 50
Fed. (2d) 413, 9 U. S. Pat. Q. 562 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931); Plough, Inc. v. Intercity
Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 978, 40 U. S. Pat. Q. 554 (E. D. Pa. 1939) ; Buffalo Yellow Cab
Co. v. Baureis, 132 Misc. 654, 230 N. Y. Supp. 343, 19 T. M. Rep. 12 (Sup. Ct. 1928) ;
Moline Pressed Steel Co. v. Dayton Toy & Specialty Co., 30 F. (2d) 16 (C. C. A.
6th, 1929). See also I.T.S. Co. v. Tee Pee Rubber Co., 288 Fed. 794, 798 (C. C. A. 6th,
1923); Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Elliott, 7 F. (2d) 962, 967 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925);
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Rosen, 108 F. (2d) 632, 636, 44 U. S. Pat. Q. 379 (C. C. A.
6th, 1940); J. F. Rowley Co. v. Rowley, 18 F. (2d) 700-704 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927);
H. Milgrim & Bros., Inc. v. Schlesinger, 168 Ore. 476, 123 P. (2d) 196, 53 U. S.
Pat. Q. 183 (1942).23
'Trappey v. McIlhenny Co., 12 .F. (2d) 19 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926).282Florence Mfg. Co. v. Dowd, 189 Fed. 44, 46 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911).
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The Sixth Circuit took the same position in 1912: "The usual practice
contemplates an accounting, and . . . such practice should be followed, and
an accounting ordered, unless it is made clearly and certainly to appear
that neither upon the existing record, nor upon any record which complainant
can make before the master, could there be any substantial recovery." They
dismissed Ludington Novelty Co. v. Levnard0 3 with the remark, "We are
satisfied that such case presented a very different problem of accounting
from that now involved." If no actual damage has been sustained, the court
will confine its relief to an injunction against any further infringement.2 3 4
The Pennsylvania Court, in 1924, said that difficulties involved present
no excuse. "A different question would arise if its imitation had been an
innocent one; being intentional the duty to account is ordinarily a matter
of right and of course.... The difficulty of stating the account is no excuse;
defendants' wrongful conduct has occasioned the trouble, and it must bear
all the burdens growing out of that fact.... It would be intolerable if one
could wrong another and escape all liability, because .it was difficult to prove
the amount of the loss."2 3 5
To order an accounting when there is no likelihood of recovery puts the
defendant to the expense of it, but if he has committed a fraud he is not
entitled to much sympathy; and if he is forced to defend himself he has
only himself to blame. There seems little reason for the court to protect
him from expense and effort although it should not authorize an accounting
where it is certain to produce no results whatever. But if plaintiff can show
no profits of defendant but can show nominal damages, the Court may well
impose compensatory damages which will adequately indemnify the plaintiff
for the injury which he has suffered.
IV. Where There Has Been Laches or Acquiescence
Where there is laches or acquiescence on plaintiff's part, coupled with
absence of fraudulent intent on defendant's part, an accounting and damages
are usually refused23 6 Holding that a delay of four years barred an account-
3127 Fed. 155 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903).
2 3 4 G. & C. Merriam v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369, 371 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912), citing,
Florence Mfg. Co. v. Dowd, 189 Fed. 44 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911).
2 3 5United Drug Co. v. Kovacs, 279 Pa. 132, 136, 123 Atl. 654, 655, 14 T. M. Rep. 207
(1924), citing, Graham v. Plate, 40 Cal. 593, 6 Am. Rep. 639 (1871).
2 3 0 Golden West Brewing Co. v. Milonas & Sons, 104 F. (2d) 880, 42 U. S. Pat. Q.
185 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) ; Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Arena & Sons, 27 F. Supp.
290, 40 U. S. Pat. Q. 639 (E. D. Pa. 1939). But see H. A. Metz Laboratories v.
American Pharmaceutical Co., 18 F. Supp. 598, 600, 33 U. S. Pat. Q. 426 (S. D. N. Y.
1936), aff'd sub. iwn., Winthrop Chemical Co. v. American Pharmaceutical Co., 94
F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), where an accounting was granted, there being "nothing
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ing, the New Jersey Chancery Court2 3 7 quoted Vice-Chancellor Wood in
Beard v. Turner :s ". . . if you induce another to lay out money by keeping
back a right, which you intend at some future time to assert, you may induce
him to incur serious expenditure. . . . But suppose you wish to profit by
that act of which you say you have a right to complain, and shall at some
future period complain of, then I apprehend this Court will say, you must
come here at once: for this reason, that you ask in the bill for an account
of the profits made by this gentleman upon the sale of the goods." Where
a controversy involves difficulty and doubt, it should be taken to court
promptly, and if this it not done the delay may bar an accounting. This
was the position of the Second Circuit in 1926.239
No rule exists as. to the length of time .which will constitute a bar. This
must depend on the circumstances of each case.
V. Where Both Parties Are at Fault
Where both parties are at fault, usually no accounting is ordered. Thus
in G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Ogilvie, ° the First Circuit Court of Appeals,
in 1909, denied an accounting to a plaintiff, who had claimed exclusive rights
in the name "Webster" on a dictionary, because this claim was false; it
interfered with defendant's lawful competition and served as one of the
causes of the litigation. But defendant, who had also filed a bill for relief,
was denied an accounting because he "had used artifice with the view of in-
ducing the public to purchase his dictionaries in lieu of those of the Merriam
to indicate acquiescence by the plaintiff, nothing to show that the defendant's use of
the label was with the belief that its conduct was not objectionable.
231The International Silver Co. v. Win. H. Rogers Corp., 66 N. J. Eq. 140, 142, 57
AUt. 725 (1904).
23813 L. T. R. (N. s.) 746, 749 (1866). See also N. K. Fairbank Co. v. Leuckel,
King & Cake Soap Co., 116 Fed. 332 (C. C. A. 9th, 1902).
2 3 9Middleby-Marsh Oven Co. v. Williams Oven Mfg. Co., 12 F. (2d) 919 (C. C. A.
2d, 1926).
240170 Fed. 167, 171 (C. C. A. 1st, 1909). "It is apparent from the record that this
claim of the Merriam Company to an exclusive right interfered with Ogilvie's trade,
and was not lawful, though honestly made. If its claim had been in harmony with the
conclusions which this court and the Circuit Court reached, and the notices and circu-
lafs had been framed accordingly, non constat Ogilvie. would not have yielded, and
this litigation been avoided. At any rate, it cannot be questioned that the action of the
Merriam Company, in the way we have explained, unlawfully threatened Ogilvie's trade
and the sale of his dictionaries; so that we have two parties, each of whom in the eyes
of the law was a tort-feasor, involved in what was after all a single controversy, having,
of course, two branches to it, and each injurious to the opposing party.
"The Merriam Company commenced with, and insisted on, the proposition that it
was entitled to the exclusive use of the word 'Webster'; and it was out of this that
the litigation arose. Under the circumstances which we have explained, equity would
not be able to do clear justice if it now permitted that corporation to demand an
accounting of profits and damages incident to the changed position which the case has
taken on."
[Vol. 32
UNFAIR COMPETITION
Company." An accounting was denied under somewhat similar circum-
stances by the same court in 1922, in O'Sullivan Rubber Co. v. Genuine
Rubber Co.2
4
VI. Where the Defendant Has Abandoned His Acts
Where a defendant abandons his acts and was not using the infringing
trade-mark when the decree was entered, and the circumstances were such
that all that is necessary to protect the plaintiff is to enjoin future use of
the mark, an accounting is not usually ordered, for plaintiff's remedy is
at law.2 42
VIi. Where the Article Involved Is of Such a Character That the Ultimate
Purchaser Cares Nothing About Who Makes or Sells It
This ground for refusing an accounting was applied in 1943 by the Second
Circuit, where the article involved was a toy bank.28
VIII. Where There Is No Evidence of Lost Sales Due to Defendant's Acts
This seems to be true in both trade-mark infringement and unfair com-
petition cases.244
IX. Where the Defendant Has Acted in Good Faith
(See the heading below entitled Good Faith as an Excuse for Relieving
Defendant from Accounting.)
X. Where There Is No Fraudulent Intent and an Injunction Will Provide
All Necessary Relief
There are also cases in which the competitive rivalry between the parties
is so remote and indirect that, where there is no fraudulent intent, an
injunction alone will provide all relief to which the plaintiff is entitled, and
for this reason an accounting may be denied. This was the opinion of three
dissenting justices of the Supreme Court in the Mishawaka case 2 45
241281 Fed. 851 (D. Mass. 1922), aff'd on this point, 287 Fed. 134 (C. C. A. 1st,
1923). See also American Crayon Co. v. Prang Co., 38 F. (2d) 448, 4 U. S. Pat. Q.
174 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930).242Pinaud, Inc. v. Huebschman, 27 F. (2d) 531 (E. D. N., Y. 1928), aff'd, 27 F.
(2d) 538 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).2 43Durable Toy & Novelty Corporation v. 3. Cheirq & Co., Inc., 133 F. (2d) 853,
56 U. S. Pat. Q. 339 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).244Tillman & Bendel, Inc. v. California Packing Corp., 63 F. (2d) 498-506, 16 U. S.
Pat. Q. 332 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933)_; Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v. Horluck's Inc., 59 F.
(2d) 13, 13 U. S. Pat. Q. 296 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).245Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U. S. 203, 62
Sup. Ct. 1022, 53 U. S. Pat. Q. 323 (1942).
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Burdenz of Proof
Where a defendant has infringed a trade-mark of plaintiff, the plaintiff's
burden is to prove his ownership of the trade-mark and its infringement.
That he is injured will be presumed. In cases of unfair competition, how-
ever, plaintiff must show that he is injured unless defendant's goods are
so similar to plaintiff's goods that they are easily confused-in which case
there may be a similar presumption of injury.240 Proof of the extent of his
injury in such cases, the measure of his damage, is another matter. It is
very seldom possible for a plaintiff to present to a court an accurate picture
of his position before defendant's acts and another of his position at the
time of trial. That would involve the extent of the public's knowledge of
his goods and his business, the extent to which his goods have been dis-
placed by defendant's infringing goods, etc. Rarely can his injury be accu-
rately portrayed in court or expressed accurately in dollars. It must be
an approximation.
But he can try. He can attempt to show his loss of sales and other in-
juries that he has suffered. These, together, must be the measure of his
damages. Defendant's profits are not a measure of plaintiff's injury or his
damages, but they may be considered in fixing the award. Presumably, at
least, he lost the sales that defendant made due to his infringing acts and
was damaged to the-extent of the profits he would have made on them. But
where the goods are different, as in the Vogue case, there is no presumption
that he lost sales and plaintiff carries the burden of proving that he was
injured and the extent of that injury. He must prove that he is injured
to some extent before exemplary damages are awarded, and also he must
show that defendant acted with malice or spite or with definite purpose
to defraud.
Where the plaintiff's trade-mark is registered "the burden is the in-
fringer's to prove that his infringement had no cash value in sales made
by him. If he does not do so, the profits made on sales of goods bearing
the infringing mark properly belong to the owner of the mark." This is
the position of the Supreme Court in the Mishawaka case, 7 citing the
Hamilton-Brown Shoe case. ,
In proving damages, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing both that
he lost sales and that the defendant's conduct caused the loss and the Sixth
2 46Wawak & Co v. Kaiser, 129 F.- (2d) 66, 54 U. S. Pat. Q. 9 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942);
William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. L. P. Larson, Jr., Co., 5 F. (2d) 731 (N. D. II. 1925).247Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. K-resge Co., 316 U. S. 203, 206,
62 Sup. Ct. 1022, 1024, 53 U. S. Pat. Q. 323 (1942). RESTATEmENT, TORTS (1938)
§ 746 (c).
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Circuit stated in a trade-mark infringement case that in proving damages,
"there is no presumption of law or fact that a plaintiff would have made
the sales that the defendant made."' ' 8 But even in proving damages, this
burden should not include a showing that each sale for which the defendant
must account was due to deceit of consumers caused by the infringement.
To limit plaintiff's recovery to the profits on such sales is impracticable.
Such a rule is impossible of application in most cases involving low priced
articles, particularly if the sales cover a wide area.
Where the infringer obtained some advantage from his tort, particularly
where he asserts that his books are lost, or he has concealed his profits, or
is unable to show them with reasonable definiteness, any burden that rested
on plaintiff to prove his loss is shifted to defendant, and the Court may
then base the award on the general situation involved. The opinion by
Judge Biggs in Gotham Hosiery Co. v. Artcraft Hosiery Mills, a patent
case,249 is an exhaustive summary of this rule.
The Restatement asserts that "if the defendant made some sales infringing
the plaintiff's trade-mark or trade name and others not infringing it, he is
liable to account for his profits on the former but not on the latter. The
burden of making the segregation is on the plaintiff... .,2o This rule must
be taken with definite qualifications, for, as stated above, to make such a
"isegregation," in many instances, is quite impossible as a practical matter.
This is a reason for the further principle that damages in unfair competition
cases need not be proved "with mathematical certainty or anything like it."
This principle as noted elsewhere was laid down by the Maine court many
years ago in the Lynn case,5 1 and should be applied today wherever possible.
Good Faith as an Excuse for Relieving Defendant from Accounting
An accounting may be denied where the defendant has acted in good
faith, 2  or acted innocently or in ignorance of the plaintiff's rights,23 pro-
248Dickinson v. 0. & W. Thum Co., 8 F. (2d) 570, 575 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925);
Oil Well Improvements Co. v. Acme Foundry & Machine Co., 31 F. (2d) 898, 901
(C. C. A. 8th, 1929); Wawak & Co. v. Kaiser, 129 F. (2d) 66, 69, 54 U. S. Pat. Q.
9, 12 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).249Gotham Silk Hosiery Co. v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills, 147 F. (2d) 209, 64
U. S. Pat. Q. 56 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944).2 50 RESTATEmENT, TORTS (1938) § 747 (c).
2 51W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., 103 Me. 334, 69 Atl. 569 (1907).
252Saxlehner v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 179 U. S. 42, 21 Sup. Ct. 16 (1900).253Regis v. Jaynes & Co., 191 Mass. 245, 77 N. E. 774 (1906). See also N. K. Fair-
bank Co. v. Windsor, 124 Fed. 200 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903) ; Peerless Rubber Mfg. Co. v.
Nichol, 187 Fed. 238 (S. D. Ohio 1911) (Accounting denied where defendants dis-
claimed guilty knowledge of the infringement, offered to desist, and the number of
illegal sales was small). Pinaud, Inc. v. Huebschman, 27 F. (2d) 531 (E. D. N. Y.
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vided he stops his illegal practices after he discovers the truth. The Penn-
sylvania Court refused to order an accounting where substitution was due
to innocent mistakes of defendant's sales people, and the amount involved
was small.2 4 The Michigan rule is that "an account of profits will not
be taken where the wrongful use of a trade-mark or trade name has been
merely accidental or without any actual or wrongful intent to defraud the
original owner or to deceive the public."255
Where a previous decision between the parties justifies defendant in be-
lieving that, with some changes in its mark, it would not be chargeable
with unfair competition, an accounting will not be ordered. Where the acts
complained of had been done in reliance on a decision that was reversed
and had ceased as soon as this reversal occurred, judge Lacombe said: "It
would be straining the doctrine of implied intent beyond all reasonable
1928), aff'd, 27 F. (2d) 538 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) (Accounting denied where defendant
was not using infringing mark at the time of suit and had voluntarily abandoned its
use). See also Dorothy Gray Salons v. Lander Co., 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 704, 46 U. S.
Pat. Q. 571 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Straus v. Notaseme Hosiery Co., 240 U. S. 179, 36 Sup.
Ct. 288 (1916). In Rubber & C.H.T. Co. v F. W. Devoe & C. T. Reynolds Co., 233
Fed. 150 (D. N. 3. 1916), the unfair competition was not "wilful and fraudulent" so
as to justify an accounting of profits, though damages were allowed.254Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 119 F. (2d) 316, 323,
49 U. S. Pat. Q. 419 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941), citing Liberty Oil Corp. v. Crowley, Milner
& Co., 270 Mich. 187, 258 N . W. 241, 25 T. M. Rep. 124 (1935) ; Hemmeter Cigar Co.
v. Congress Cigar Co., 118 F. (2d) 64, 49 U. S. Pat. Q. 122 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
See also Straus v. Notaseme Hosiery Co., 240 U. S. 179, 36 Sup. Ct. 288 (1916). In
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Emener, 16 F. Supp. 816, 826, 32 U. S. Pat. Q. 152 (E. D.
Mich. 1936), it was said: "In view of the defendant's apparent good faith and not
unreasonable belief that he was doing all that could be expected of him in the way of
avoiding deception of the public, and it appearing uncertain as to whether the plaintiff
could establish sufficiently definite and substantial injury from the past acts of the
defendant to justify the expense of an accounting, I am not satisfied that plaintiff
has sustained the burden of showing that it is entitled to such an accounting." But see
Pease v. Scott County Milling Co., 5 F. (2d) 524, 527 (E. D. Mo. 1925), where the
court limited the accounting to a time subsequent to the filing of the bill of complaint
on the grounds that no "actionable recalcitrancy or any malicious or intentional in-
fringement' was shown. ". . . the parties honestly believed that they had the right to
use the trade-mark in question." On this point see also Holley Milling Co. v. Salt Lake
City & Jordan M & E Co., 58 Utah 149, 197 Pac. 731, 11 T. M. Rep. 225 (1921) and
cases cited therein. Gehl v. Hebe Co., 276 Fed. 271 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921) (While de-
fendant's good faith might have a bearing on the question of punitive damages, it did
not affect the award of actual damages, if any).
255B.V.D. Co. v. Kaufmann & Baer Co., 279 Pa. 152, 156, 123 Atl. 656, 657, 14 T. M.
Rep. 203 (1924). 'We are convinced that each of these sales was innocently made,
partly because defendant's salespeople erroneously believed the initials B.V.D. desig-
nated a particular character of underwear, rather than a specific make, and partly
because of the facts hereinafter set forth. Any other conclusion than that of innocence,
would convict them of conduct which would subject them to the risk of discharge[since they were directed never to make substitutions, but always to give to customers
the exact goods asked for], without there being any possibility of individual gain
to them" 1
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bounds to hold that one who bought, made and sold while that decision ...
remained in force, intended to enter into an 'unlawful competition.' "256
New York courts follow the "Fairbank case2 7 and hold that a defendant
must account if he knows, or must be presumed to know, the probable effect
of his act on the rights of others. There is a similar rule in Massachusetts:
"The account is ordered to be taken only since the filing of the original bill,
upon the charge made in the supplemental bill .... It cannot be said that
this conduct on their part was in ignorance of the plaintiff's rights; they
were at least put upon inquiry, and must be charged with knowledge of what
they would have learned upon reasonable inquiry."5 8 This decision was
in 1906.
"In view of the defendant's apparent good faith and not unreasonable
belief that he was doing all that could be expected of him in the way of
avoiding deception of the public, and it appearing uncertain as to whether
the plaintiff could establish sufficiently definite and substantial injury from
the past acts of the defendant to justify the expense of an accounting, I am
not satisfied that plaintiff has sustained the burden of showing that it is
entitled to such an accounting."2' 9
In 1937, the Illinois court held that even where the defendant had acted
in good faith and tried to settle with plaintiff, since it was shown that de-
fendant made profits through the means he used, plaintiff is entitled to an
accounting 2 60 The Missouri court in 1911, citing an earlier California case,
said that whether the defendant acted in good faith or not, the plaintiff was
entitled to compensation for injury, and if defendant acted with malice,
"the idea of compensation is abandoned and that of punishment intro-
duced."2 6'
Where defendant is guilty of bad faith, an account is justified and plaintiff
should have opportunity to show any profits or damages or both which he
2Z6N. K. Fairbank Co. v. Windsor, 124 Fed. 200 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903). See also Dr.
A. Reed Cushion Shoe Co. v. Frew, 158 Fed. 552 (C. C. W. D. N. Y. 1908), aff'd as
to accounting, 162 Fed. 887 (C. C. A. 2d, 1908).257'0neida Community, Ltd. v. Oneida Game Trap Co., Inc., 150 N. Y. Supp. 918,
5 T. M. Rep. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1914), modified on other grounds, 168 App. Div. 769, 154
N. Y. Supp. 391 (3d Dep't 1915); Dickey v. Mutual Film Corp., 186 App. Div. 701,
174 N. Y. Supp. 784 (1st Dep't 1919); Franklin Simon & Co. v. Bramley Blouses, Inc.,
170 Misc. 844, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 42, 29'T. M. Rep. 605 (Sup. Ct. 1939).258Regis v. Jaynes & Co., 191 Mass. 245, 248, 77 N. E. 774, 776 (1906). See also
United Drug Co. v. Kovacs, 279 Pa. 132, 123 Atl. 654, 14 T. M. Rep. 207 (1924).2 59Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Emener, 16 F. Supp. 816, 826, 27 T. M. Rep. 95
(E. D. Mich. 1936). See supra note 254.260Hershel California Fruit Products Co. v. Contadina Brokerage and Distributing
Co., 292 Ill. App. 158, 10 N. E. (2d) 720 (1937).261Jacob Lampert v. Judge & Dolph Drug Co., 238 Mo. 409, 419, 141 S. W. 1095,
1098 (1911).
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can, even though only nominal damages of one cent were awarded. Such
a decree may carry all costs since plaintiff will be presumed to have suffered
some injury and that injury will be-increased by the expense of the account
proceedings. 262 But where a defendant furnishes plaintiff with accounts be-
fore a reference for profits and offers settlement, the master's fee may be
assessed against the plaintiff.26
Reference will be found in the cases to the motive or intent of defendants
and to the necessity of a showing by plaintiff of willful misrepresenta-
tion or fraudulent intent and the like. But plaintiff's loss is loss regardless
of the defendant's motive and in most cases of unfair competition the de-
fendant's acts were planned with a sfiister motive and with definite purpose
of misrepresenting his goods to a rival's injury, or of injuring him in some
other manner. The California courts hold that where no actual fraud or
intent to injure is shown and defendant acted in good faith, no accounting
will be ordered.23 4
On April 1, 1946 the President approved a bill revising Section 70 of
the Patent Law.
Prior to this amendment, this statute provided that in the event of infringe-
ment of a patent "the complainant shall be entitled to recover, in addition
to the profits to be accounted for by the defendant, the damages the com-
plainant has sustained thereby, and the court shall assess the same or cause
the same to be assessed under its direction."2 65
The amendment provides that "the complainant shall be entitled to recover
general damages which shall be due compensation for making, using, or
selling the invention, not less than a reasonable royalty therefor, together
with his costs and reasonable attorney's fees to be fixed by the court and
interest from the time the infringement occurred."
No one knows to what extent this statute will cure the conditions, of
which Mr. Frederick P. Fish in 1929 said: "The result is that there is a
complete failure of justice in almost every case in which supposed profits
are recovered or recoverable." 266 This amendment does eliminate profits
except as a possible element in damages and it is hoped that it may do away
with most references before Masters to establish profits.
262 Obear-Nester Glass Co. v. United Drug Co., 53 F. Supp. 744, 60 U. S. Pat. Q. 171(E. D. Mo. 1944); Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305
U. S. 315, 59 Sup. Ct. 191, 39 U. S. Pat. Q. 402 (1938).2 63Treasure Imports, Inc. v. Henry Amdur & Sons, Inc., 127 F. (2d) 3, 52 U. S.
Pat. Q. 598 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).264Wood v. Peffer, 55 Cal. App. (2d) 116, 130 P. (2d) 220 (1942).
26542 STAT. 392 (1922), 35 U. S. C. § 70 (1940).
266Letter to Hovson, January 4, 1929.
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In any event, this legislation is an indication that Congress, the legal
profession, and business men, at last, recognize some of the evils of the
present system which Mr. Fish so vigorously characterized in another place
in his letter as "a complete and absolute failure."
Perhaps our equity courts in deciding trade-mark and unfair competition
cases will adopt the suggestion of Congress in this amendment with respect
to patent cases, and will refuse to order accounting of profits in such cases.
Unfortunately, the Federal Trade-Mark Act of July 5, 1946 (Section 35)
provides that the owner of a trade-mark registered under that Act may
recover the defendant's profits as well as damages and costs. This provision,
however, need not affect unfair competition cases and cases not involving
marks registered under this Act.
Conclusion
A reading of the foregoing pages of this article will, perhaps, give one
a reasonably realistic idea of the many, many rules and principles, techni-
calities and time-consuming processes involved in determining an award to
a plaintiff, and the possibilities which the present procedure affords for
delaying, prolonging and adding to the expense and irritation of the one
who is seeking to obtain his rights through the courts. This procedure is
unnecessarily complicated and technical; it retuires far too great an ex-
penditure of time and money; it lends itself far too readily to abuse in that
it can be used to wear down a plaintiff and force settlements; it fails to
afford an effective deterrent against unfair practices; in some instances, it
brings discredit on courts and the law; it plays into the hands of litigants
with great resources and is correspondingly unfair to litigants of small
means; and hence often constitutes a denial of justice to the latter.
Where a defendant is found to have infringed a trade-mark or committed
unfair acts, it is usually impossible, in the very nature of things, to trans-
late into dollars the exact injury he has inflicted. Almost never can the
exact amount of his profits be computed. Too many considerations, too many
uncertain elements, are involved to permit of exactness. These rules were
formulated when they were fewer articles of merchandise sold and fewer
sales by each merchant, and sales were made under far different conditions,
all of which made the ascertainment of profits and damages a simple matter
compared with conditions today.
The courts might well hold that accountings of profits will not be ordered
except where justice can be had in no other way, that awards to plaintiffs
in equity causes will be ascertained by the court, not by masters, and
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that the evidence on which they are based will be limited to enough facts
about plaintiff's business and the extent and effect of defendant's wrongful
acts to enable the court or jury to make a fair approximation of the injury
which plaintiff has suffered. This is all that is permitted in various kinds
of other tort actions, and is all that should be permitted here. The principles
which underlie exemplary damages, which have been recognized for genera-
tions, afford ample basis for such modification of the rules discussed above,
applied as they are in cases where fraud is almost always present. Profits
and damages in unfair competition cases are controlled by the common law
of the states. So also in trade-mark cases, except where action is based on
a federal registration. These common law rules can be changed by the courts
of the states, and where legislation is necessary, by state legislatures. It will
be seen from the foregoing pages how great a part the state courts have had
in formulating the present principles. It seems not too much to hope that
the same courts will now modify these rules, without legislation, adapt them
to modern requirements and do away with existing abuses-for abuses they
certainly are-that cry, out for improvement.
